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REFORMING STATE BAIL REFORM
Shima Baradaran Baughman,* Lauren Boone,** & Nathan Jackson***
We are waist-deep in the third wave of bail reform. Scholars, policy mak-
ers, and the public have realized that the short period of detention before
trial creates ripple effects on a defendant’s judicial fate and has lasting im-
pacts on our system of mass incarceration. Over 200 proposed bail bills are
pending throughout the states. This is not the first period of bail reform in
America—two previous waves of bail reform in the 1960s and 1980s have
both ended in increased pretrial detention for defendants. Some of the re-
cent efforts in the third wave of bail reform have also increased detention in
different states and have caused other unanticipated problems. This invited
piece aims to create a relatively short guide for those contemplating the best
path to reform bail. It lays out steps to reform state bail reform efforts by
focusing on seven considerations often neglected in bail reform
discussions.
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INTRODUCTION
BAIL, or pretrial detention reform, is sweeping the nation as weare currently in the “third” wave of American bail reform.1 Therehas been a realization in the last ten years that the initial decision
to incarcerate someone—even for a few days—has a substantial impact
on whether they are incarcerated long term, whether they maintain a job
and home,2 and whether they are able to appropriately defend their
case.3 In part due to advocacy efforts, attempts to cut criminal justice
costs, and the pressure of civil rights litigation, states and counties have
championed various bail reform efforts in their jurisdictions.4 In the last
1. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 949,
1012 (2020) (discussing the various bail reform efforts states and cities have undertaken in
recent years with the current third wave of bail reform particularly focused on implement-
ing pretrial risk assessments).
2. See Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling & David F. Weiman, The Labor Market Con-
sequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 410, 411 (2001) (noting that the
stigma of incarceration makes ex-inmates unattractive across many sectors of the job mar-
ket, and such effects can be seen from as early as juvenile delinquency); Ben Gifford,
Prison Crime and the Economics of Incarceration, 71 STAN. L. REV. 71, 92 n.121 (2019)
(citing Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration 3, 18
(Aug. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/up
loads/sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WU9-XZBJ] (noting a “clear positive
relationship between incarceration and recidivism and a negative relationship between in-
carceration and future employment” and highlighting that “[e]ach additional year behind
bars reduces post-release employment by 3.6 percentage points” and that “[a]mong felony
defendants with stable pre-charge earnings incarcerated for one or more years, post-re-
lease employment drops by at least 24 percentage points”)). See generally Hensleigh Crow-
ell, A Home of One’s Own: The Fight Against Illegal Housing Discrimination Based on
Convictions, and Those Who are Still Left Behind, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2017) (dis-
cussing housing discrimination against people with criminal convictions, the effects of un-
stable housing or homelessness on previously incarcerated individuals, and its connection
to recidivism).
3. See Paul Nieuwbeerta, Daniel S. Nagin & Arjan A.J. Blokland, Assessing the Im-
pact of First-Time Imprisonment on Offenders’ Subsequent Criminal Career Development:
A Matched Samples Comparison, 25 J. QUANT. CRIM. 227, 228 (2009) (arguing that the
experience of imprisonment reduces an incarcerated individual’s legal prospects, which “in
turn may cause imprisonment to increase rather than decrease the imprisoned offenders’
future criminal involvement”); Nick Petersen, Do Detainees Plead Guilty Faster? A Sur-
vival Analysis of Pretrial Detention and the Timing of Guilty Pleas, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
REV. 1015 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0887403419838020 [https://
perma.cc/49EQ-EFV2] (“[Pretrial] detainees plead guilty 2.86 times faster than defendants
released pretrial do.”); Press Release, Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the
Poor: How Money Bail Perpetuates an Endless Cycle of Poverty and Jail Time, Prison Pol’y
Initiative (May 10, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html [https://
perma.cc/NN8S-SMHU].
4. See Bail Reform, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org/ar-
eas-of-focus/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/2ZCL-GEKW]; Bail Reform, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/J8NE-2TBB]; New York’s
New Bail Reform Model: The Next Wave of Bail Reform Goes Beyond Ending Money Bail,
VERA INST., https://craft2.vera.org/state-of-justice-reform/2019/bail-reform [https://perma.
cc/YH2H-LHCT]; Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1399, 1403 & nn.9–11, 1404 & n.15 (2017) (outlining various bail reform advocacy efforts);
Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed Into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the
Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2016) (describing how financial “innova-
tions” surrounding bail have “metastasized” “criminal process into a booming source of
revenue for state courts and corrections departments”); SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN,
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ten years, some cities have abolished money bail altogether,5 some have
instituted risk assessments to increase data-driven release decisions by
judges,6 and others have increased the role of pretrial release
supervision.7
THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 170 (2017) (highlighting the work of Equal Justice Under Law who filed ten class
action challenges to the constitutionality of commercial money bail); Challenging the
Money Bail System, CIV. RTS. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/wealth-based-
detention [https://perma.cc/5SVY-9V67] (providing a list of ongoing bail related litigation
across various states); ACLU Files Federal Class Action Lawsuit Challenging Discrimina-
tory Cash Bail System That Punishes Poor People in Detroit, ACLU (Apr. 14, 2019), https:/
/www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-files-federal-class-action-lawsuit-challenging-discrimina-
tory-cash-bail-system [https://perma.cc/GE9Q-56PP].
5. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 171 (noting that cash bail has been abolished in cities
in Alabama, Kansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana); Pretrial Fairness Act, H.B. 3347, 101st
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021) (abolishing monetary bail in Illinois); Yiming Fu, Pre-
trial Fairness Act Would Make Illinois First State to Abolish Cash Bail, DAILY NW. (Jan. 21,
2021), https://dailynorthwestern.com/2021/01/21/top-stories/pretrial-fairness-act-would-
make-illinois-first-state-to-abolish-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/NXE6-XTPB] (reporting on
the Illinois legislature’s passing the bill that was signed by the governor on February 22,
2021); see also Illinois Becomes First State to Commit to Eliminating Cash Bail, NBC (Feb.
22, 2021, 10:31 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-
eliminate-cash-bail/2444424 [https://perma.cc/BPT9-DJ6Q]; Public Act 101-0652, H.B.
3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021). As of January 17, 2020, Kentucky’s De-
partment of Public Advocacy (Kentucky’s public defender system) petitioned the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court on this issue asking the court to “enter an order directing the Court
of Justice to refrain from using money bail in any case involving an indigent person, unless
there is a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the individual presents a danger to
the community.” See WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 2
(2021). Oregon still allows cash bail, although Oregon’s Metropolitan Public Defender (the
largest public defender in the state) has launched a concerted campaign aimed at ending
cash bail. Oregon: State-wide Bail, CIV. RTS. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/
wealth-based-detention/oregon-state-wide-bail [https://perma.cc/53NN-L3RX]. California
attempted to abolish cash bail. See S.B. 10, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018)
(disapproved in Nov. 3, 2020 Referendum); Patrick McGreevy, Prop. 25, Which Would
Have Abolished California’s Cash Bail System, Is Rejected by Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2020 8:49 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-elec-
tion-prop-25-results [https://perma.cc/JG27-XDU7]. See generally Adam Peterson, The Fu-
ture of Bail in California: Analyzing SB 10 Through the Prism of Past Reforms, 53 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 263 (2019) (examining California’s criminal justice reform efforts through
analysis of SB 10, the California Money Bail Reform Act of 2017).
6. See, e.g., CHRISTINE BLUMAUER, ALESSANDRA BROWN, MARIELLA CASTALDI,
SELEEKE FLINGAI, PHILLIP HERNANDEZ, STEFANIE MAVRONIS, KATIE PIERCE, TOM STAN-
LEY-BECKER & JORDAN STOCKDALE, ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN MARYLAND: PRO-
GRESS AND POSSIBILITIES 23 (2018), https://spia.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/
Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_Maryland_2018-Feb27_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AHF-
BC6P] (noting that “[r]isk assessment tools are cornerstones of many successful bail re-
form efforts across the country”); Release Assessment N.Y. CITY CRIM. JUST. AGENCY,
https://www.nycja.org/release-assessment [https://perma.cc/2LMA-NPA2] (describing the
risk assessment tool used by the CJA which has resulted in “NYC releas[ing] more defend-
ants without monetary conditions than any other big city in the country”); STATE OF N.J.
DEP’T OF L. & PUB. SAFETY, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: JANUARY – DECEMBER – 2017
(May 4, 2018), https://www.njsp.org/ucr/pdf/current/20180504_crimetrend_2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7Q9C-BLWB] (New Jersey reform efforts included a risk assessment to evaluate
releases with positive results including low rearrest rates and high appearance in court
rates.).
7. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/pji/the_state_of_pretrial_in_america_pji_20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GBV-SEYT] (highlighting Washington, D.C.’s implementation of
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This is not the first attempt to reform bail in America, and perspective
on our current situation might help us avoid the mistakes of the past. In
the 1960s and 1980s, advocates attempted to improve pretrial release and
reduce the use of money bail. These efforts culminated in two rounds of
national bail reform legislation that actually expanded the legitimate
ways to detain defendants pretrial.8 While judges in the 1950s could not
order the detention of an individual before trial unless they were a flight
risk or were charged with a capital offense, judges gained a multitude of
other reasons through the 1960s and 1980s to detain individuals before
trial in the name of “preventative detention.”9 As no one at the time
predicted, these latter two waves of bail reform opened the way to in-
creased detention.10 Efforts of the bail industry lobby starting in the
1990s increased detention even further.11
To illustrate how dramatic the change was, from 1970 to 2017, the num-
a pretrial services agency, which employs graduated supervision levels for pretrial release
with a demonstrated high success rate; noting also that the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency
operates 24 hours and reports that 89% of arrested people released before trial are not
arrested for new charges while their cases are adjudicated and 98% are not arrested on a
crime of violence while in the community pending trial); RICHARD WILLIAMS, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., BAIL OR JAIL 30 (2012), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/
magazine/articles/2012/SL_0512-Jail.pdf?ver=2012-04-16-110023-847 [https://perma.cc/
X5N4-98QF] (noting Kentucky increased pretrial services and eliminated money bail);
Criminal Justice Reform: Pretrial Services Program, N.J. JUDICIARY, https://
www.njcourts.gov/forms/12088_cjr_pretrial_svcs_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK3H-
GWDA] (noting New Jersey implemented pretrial services to ensure quick release and
proper pretrial monitoring); POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., NEW CHALLENGES AND PROMISING
PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL RELEASE, DIVERSION, AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUPERVISION
(2020) (discussing Davidson County, Tennessee’s reforms that increased automation, stan-
dardized risk assessments and expanded options for community-based supervision of low
risk defendants with results of increased pretrial release to 73% with declining jail popula-
tions of 32% and a cost savings of 2.7 million in 2018).
8. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 22–27. Where historically pretrial detention was per-
mitted only for a defendant posing a flight risk or charged with a capital crime, during
these “bail reform” periods, courts began detaining defendants who posed a safety risk and
those who had substantial evidence against them of a serious crime.
9. See id.; An Act To Revise Existing Bail Practices in Courts of the United States,
and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 89–465, 80 Stat. 214–17 (1966) (permitted judges to
consider such factors as “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight
of the evidence against the accused, the accused’s family ties, employment, financial re-
sources, character and mental condition, the length of [his] residence in the community, his
record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings”); Joint Resolu-
tion: Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other Purposes,
H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984) (adding factors that judges may consider including,
“past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history,” and “the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person’s release”).
10. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 723, 738–54 (2011) (outlining the changes to federal pretrial law from the 1960s
through the 1980s and the ensuing results, including increased detention); BAUGHMAN,
supra note 4, at 44–45 (documenting the third wave of bail reform, the shift to a risk-based
system). Between the years of 2000 to 2016, pre-disposition inmates accounted for 95% of
the total jail population increase. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., JAIL INMATES IN 2016
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2QW-2DKU].
11. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 27.
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ber of people detained in jails prior to conviction rose by 433%.12 State
pretrial detention rates climbed 77% from 1990 to 2019, and federal rates
rose 20% over a similar time period.13 The number of people incarcer-
ated in U.S. jails before conviction for the same time frame has increased
by 131.8%.14 State detention rates were about 40% on average between
the years 1990 and 2004.15 High pretrial detention continues to persist
with pretrial detainees accounting for a reported 74% of the nation’s jail
population as of 2020.16
 The current third wave of bail reform is on its way to the same fate as
the last two iterations. There are over 200 pending bail bills among the
states,17 as well as a Uniform Law Commission proposal aiming to reform
12. LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE DENIED:
THE HARMFUL AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 1 (2019), https://
www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JJN3-44AS].
13. ZHEN ZENG & TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JAIL INMATES IN 2019 3, 5
tbl.3 (2021), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JQ4-G5GQ];
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/US/RHI825219 [https://perma.cc/WAC8-7SN2] (the rate of the unconvicted popula-
tion in jails per 100,000 Americans is calculated as follows: (Unconvicted / Total US Popu-
lation)*100,000 = Unconvicted in jail per 100,000. For 2019: (480,700 / 328,239,523)*100,000
= 146.45 per 100,000 in 2019); DARRELL K. GILLARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 1995, at 11 tbl.13 (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/PJI95.PDF [https://perma.cc/EMA5-8JHU]; By Decade: 1990, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU (Apr. 1, 1990), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/decade.19
90.html [https://perma.cc/A5FF-LY35] (For 1990: (207,358 / 248,709,873)*100,000 = 83.37
per 100,000 in 1990. The change from 83.37 to 146.45 is an increase of 75.66%, rounded to
77%). Between 1995 and 2010 alone, the percentage of federal defendants detained pre-
trial rose from 59% to 79%. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL DETEN-
TION AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 1995-2010 1 (2013), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmfdc9510.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TRP-FPYR] (noting that
in recent years, some federal courts report pretrial detainee populations of over 80% with
New Jersey, North Dakota, and Nebraska reporting 82%, 84%, and 87% percent
respectively).
14. GILLARD & BECK, supra note 13, at 11 tbl.13; ZENG & MINTON, supra note 13, at 5
tbl.3 (in 2019 the number incarcerated but not convicted was 480,700). This is a 131.92%
increase ([(480,700 – 207,358)/207,358] *100 = 131.92% increase).
15. See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATE COURT
PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
STATE COURTS 1 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T23N-7KMF]; Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
jailsovertime.html [https://perma.cc/3B45-LM4E] (reporting jail trends by state).
16. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html#slide
shows/slideshow1/2 [https://perma.cc/PSS3-D7BS].
17. See Baughman, supra note 1, at 1022 n.442 (providing instructions for locating this
figure via the National Conference of State Legislatures database); see also The Bail Pro-
ject Applauds Introduction of ‘Zero-Dollar’ Bail Legislation, THE BAIL PROJECT (Jan. 27,
2021), https://bailproject.org/the-bail-project-applauds-introduction-of-zero-dollar-bail-leg-
islation [https://perma.cc/9UXD-HELW] (celebrating California SB 262 and AB 329, which
would reset the presumptive bail amounts to zero for most misdemeanor or low-level fel-
ony offenders); PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING
4–9 (2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/pji/where_pretrial_improvements_are_hap
pening_jan2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LJ3-MNJX] (providing a list of recent efforts on
pretrial litigation including descriptions of both recently passed bills and proposed bills).
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pretrial detention.18 Cities and states who have adopted risk instruments
have seen increased detention pretrial.19 The infamous California money
bail bill started as an ambitious effort but became marred in political
compromises.20 And a recent Uniform Law Commission Pretrial Release
& Detention Act (the ULC Act) may lead to increased detention.21 The
ULC Act is the latest attempt at bail reform, and while it takes several
important steps in the right direction, it is missing some key elements to
reducing detention rates nationwide. We will discuss this bill as an exam-
ple in various sections addressed in this piece.
There are certainly many shortcomings in current bail legislation, and
many of these have been addressed by top scholars and advocates across
the country.22 The purpose of this piece is not to discuss in detail any
18. UNIF. PRETRIAL RELEASE & DETENTION ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021) [hereinaf-
ter ULC Act].
19. Baughman, supra note 1, at 984 (“[R]isk assessments are increasingly being ap-
plied as an improvement to money bail but sometimes end up treating misdemeanors like
felonies and leading to increased detention for misdemeanor offenses, or failing to reduce
detention overall.”); see Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 303, 355 (2018) (providing data illustrating the decrease in non-financial pretrial
release (i.e., increase in detention) in Kentucky with the adoption of the Public Safety
Assessment tool); DAVID G. ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, INC., CIVIL RIGHTS
AND PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 3 (2019), https://www.safetyandjusticechal
lenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Robinson-Koepke-Civil-Rights-Critical-Issue-
Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PQY-VCR9] (“[I]t remains unclear whether [risk assessment]
tools typically cause substantial and lasting reductions in jailing.”).
20. S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (repealing bail procedures based
upon risk assessments of defendants and that eliminated monetary bail).
21. Examples of jurisdictions that have adopted bail reform bills that have either in-
creased or failed to reduce detention rates include Kentucky, Virginia, Utah, New Jersey,
Colorado, and California. For further explanation, see Baughman, supra note 1, at
1014–22; ULC Act, supra note 18.
22. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 683 (2018)
[hereinafter Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk] (discussing the needed “nuance in the defini-
tion of nonappearance and flight, both in actuarial risk-assessment tools and in bail reform
efforts more broadly”); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Reforming Pretrial Decision-Making, 55 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 857, 861 (2020) [hereinafter Reforming Pretrial Decision-Making] (discuss-
ing the history of bail reform and noting that “[w]hile some reforms have placed limits on
judicial power, most have not significantly reduced judicial discretion over pretrial deci-
sion-making”); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 590 (2017)
(discussing the effect of recently established community bail funds on the pretrial money
bail system); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Conse-
quences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715–16 (2017) (address-
ing the profound consequences of pretrial detention for misdemeanor offenses both within
and beyond the criminal justice system); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands:
Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297,
1303 (2012) (discussing the abuses of pretrial detention as punishment, resulting from the
failures of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and dangerousness evaluations); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 425 (2016) (discussing the impact of judicial
discretion on the current bail system and proposing judicial discretion be replaced with
“bail guidelines” to determine whether defendants should be released); Jenny E. Carroll,
Beyond Bail, 73 FLA. L. REV. 143, 148 (2021) (arguing that “that the reduction or eradica-
tion of monetary bail alone has not, and will not, ensure a fair and unbiased system of
pretrial detention”); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1399, 1416 (2017) (providing a broad conceptual framework for how policymakers can de-
sign a better bail system by weighing both the costs and benefits of pre-trial detention);
Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 507 (2018) (addressing bail
reform’s failure to assess defendants’ crime risk and dangerousness as equal to that of non-
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particular reform strategy, but to provide jurisdictions considering bail
reform a guide to follow comprised of our research as well as that of
many others. Most of the reforms that we highlight are not discussed with
any theoretical or empirical rigor. In this invited symposium piece, rather
than providing meaningful depth, we hope to instead provide some brief
insights on some of the key factors missing in bail reform.
This Article discusses several important considerations in state bail re-
form legislation. Although neither exhaustive nor complete, this Article
aims to cover some of the key areas to address for meaningful pretrial
detention reform. All of these factors are important to reforming state
bail reform legislation. First, states must change the underlying presump-
tions pretrial from detention to release. In other words, the presumption
of innocence must prevail pretrial unless it is impossible to release an
individual safely. Second, states must ensure representation for detained
individuals for all pretrial hearings, including the first pretrial release
hearing. Third, they must implement more robust data tracking to facili-
tate the development of more accurate and less discriminatory pretrial
reports and risk assessment instruments for evaluating pretrial release.
Studying all pretrial instruments to determine whether any bias results
should be a regular part of pretrial practice. Fourth, states must acknowl-
edge the difference between flight and nonappearance and refuse to de-
tain individuals for a failure to appear. Fifth, they must eliminate cash
bail and replace it with release on recognizance, monitoring with pretrial
services or electronic monitoring when absolutely necessary, or condi-
tional release. Sixth, they must ensure pretrial reform does not violate
constitutional due process of law principles, including judicial pretrial
fact-finding. Finally, they must create a narrow detention net with the
ultimate goal of release, only detaining defendants who are determined to
be impossible to release safely pretrial. We attempt to highlight key issues
of pretrial detention reform that are missing from current models in an
attempt to avoid the bail reform mistakes of the past.
Most importantly, we hope that jurisdictions considering bail reform
will first set a proper detention net—one that is narrow and allows pre-
sumptive pretrial release (without a hearing) for the vast majority of ac-
cused individuals. The first and last principles will discuss this important
proposed reform. If due process and the presumption of innocence are
maintained and if the presumption is to release, the law must make it
difficult to detain an individual before trial, not the opposite. Therefore,
rather than adding factors for judges to consider pretrial and allowing a
potentially random determination, jurisdictions should set a protocol that
allows release for all individuals except those who fall in the detention
net due to a substantial burden of releasing the individual safely. The
defendants, while imposing harsher pretrial restraints); Douglas L. Colbert, “With a Little
Help from my Friends:” Counsel at Bail and Enhanced Pretrial Justice Becomes the New
Reality, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795, 803 (2020); Russell M. Gold & Ronald F. Wright,
The Political Patterns of Bail Reform, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 743, 756 (2020).
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detention net should be narrow and aim to only capture those individuals
who pose a significant public safety threat to specific individuals that can-
not be managed through pretrial conditions. Those who are charged with
misdemeanors or nonforcible felonies23 should not be captured in the de-
tention net, as it should only capture individuals charged with forcible
felonies (i.e., serious felonies usually perpetrated with violence) who have
a history of violent crime.24 The remainder of this invited piece explains
this detention net and other common problems in bail reform legislation.
In order to avoid the mistakes of the prior waves of bail reform, we must
realize that adding new factors or new data tools will not improve pretrial
release rates. The overarching pretrial reform that can help improve pre-
trial release is a presumption of release for most defendants (felony and
misdemeanor) with a shallow detention net for the most dangerous
defendants.25
I. CHANGING PRESUMPTION TO RELEASE PRETRIAL
Ideally, pretrial release legislation creates a presumption or default of
release, where the government has to show substantial cause to detain an
individual pretrial or set conditions on release. One common problem
with pretrial legislation is that the presumption is typically detention, not
release.26 Most individuals should be released on their own recognizance
23. We refer to forcible felonies throughout this piece. The definition of a forcible
felony will vary across jurisdiction, but generally these include very serious felony offenses.
For example, forcible felonies in Illinois include “treason, first degree murder, second de-
gree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual as-
sault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm
or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
8 (LexisNexis 2012).
24. See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV.
497, 544–45 (2012) (noting that defendants below forty years of age present a higher risk of
pretrial crime). Illinois’s recently adopted bail reform act is a good example of limiting its
detention net to violent forcible felonies and a variety of other felonies only where there is
a “real and present threat to the physical safety of any person or persons.” Public Act 101-
0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 110-4.1(c) (Ill. 2021).
25. See Open Letter from James Austin, Ph.D., JFA Inst., Sarah L. Desmarais, Ph.D.,
N. Carolina St. Univ. & John Monahan, Ph.D., Univ. of Virginia Sch. of Law, to Pretrial
Justice Inst., [hereinafter Open Letter from James Austin] http://www.gopopai.org/docs/
2020/article_item/Open_Letter_to_the_Pretrial_Justice_Institute.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D6VF-ELWK]) (“Given that most detained defendants are suitable candidates for release
based on the criteria of flight risk and danger to the community, there should be a pre-
sumption of release.”). See generally MELISSA HAMILTON, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM – THEORY AND PRACTICE: A
RESOURCE GUIDE (2020), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/a92d7c30-32d4-4b49-9c57-
6c14ed0b9894/riskassessmentreportnovember182020.pdf [https://perma.cc/35NA-9Z4S].
26. See Baughman, supra note 1, at 1022–24 (explaining that recent bail reform has
failed to incorporate a presumption of release). For example, Utah presumes an individ-
ual’s pretrial detention if the individual has committed certain felonies, the “prosecution
demonstrates substantial evidence to support the charge, and meets all additional eviden-
tiary burdens,” or “the court finds that no conditions that may be imposed upon granting
the individual pretrial release will reasonably ensure” the individual’s court appearance,
the safety of others, or no obstruction of justice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(7)(a)–(c)
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(with no conditions) from the police station before a court hearing. For
those who are charged with forcible violent felonies, the government
should suggest conditions for release, or the court should impose such
conditions on its own accord.27 Only if there are no conditions that allow
safe release should a person be detained pretrial. Also, the factors consid-
ered by judges should be limited to prohibit finding any facts pretrial.28
Accordingly, a bill has a presumption of release when most individuals
are released from the police station or, in instances where the crime is a
forcible felony, the individual is released unless the government can show
that the individual poses a significant risk to public safety by clear and
convincing evidence. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rebuttable
presumptions in the wrong direction for many federal crimes, not just the
most serious crimes.29 For example, the burden to produce evidence rests
(West 2020). The statute fails to create a presumption of a defendant’s release and to place
the burden of proving detention necessary, by a clear and convincing standard, upon the
government. See id.; see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(a) (West 2021) (authorizing
detention without distinguishing between felony and misdemeanor charges, and allowing
the court to issue a defendant’s pretrial release, either on recognizance or on an unsecured
appearance bond, at the court’s discretion upon review of “any information that may be
provided by a prosecutor or the eligible defendant,” instead of requiring the prosecutor to
prove detention necessary by a clear and convincing standard); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-
3.8(a)–(b) (West 2017) (requiring the court only to “consider” the results of its pretrial risk
assessment “if available” along with “other relevant factors” and allowing the court to
“consider releasing” “an arrestee [who] does not present a substantial risk of flight or dan-
ger” based on those factors, rather than presuming an individual’s release and placing the
burden upon the government to show detention is necessary).
27. Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 110-10(b) (Ill.
2021) (“The court may impose other conditions . . . if the court finds that such conditions
are reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance in court, protect the public
from the defendant, or prevent the defendant’s unlawful interference with the orderly ad-
ministration of justice[.]”); id. § 110-2(b) (“Additional conditions of release . . . shall be set
only when it is determined that they are necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance in
court, assure the defendant does not commit any criminal offense, and complies with all
conditions of pretrial release.”).
28. See infra Part VI.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The statute presumes pretrial detention of an individual if “no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure” either (1) the individual’s
appearance and the “safety of any other person and the community” or (2) “the safety of
any other person and the community,” based on certain offenses of the individual’s prior
criminal record. While the person may rebut this presumption, the statute nonetheless
presumes such person’s detention. This fails to align with the presumption of innocence.
Instead, the statute should presume the person’s release and place the burden upon the
government. See generally Baughman, supra note 10; TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, CTR. FOR
LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES, “MODEL” BAIL LAWS: RE-DRAWING THE LINE
BETWEEN PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION 41 (2017), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=E0ff560c-6de6-
db75-02ea-2af46f94e875&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/8V4M-S9TF] (“Even the federal
government . . . has allowed the federal statute to lead to over-detention through a widen-
ing of the detention eligibility net and rebuttable presumptions in ways the Court might
not approve today.”). Section 3142(f) provides certain offenses and risks that require de-
tention: (A) those charged with “a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591 [for sex
trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion], or an offense listed in section
2332b(g)(5)(B) [for acts of terrorism] for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years or more is prescribed; (B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life impris-
onment or death;” drug offenses which carry a maximum sentence greater than ten years;
repeat felony offenders; “any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves
456 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
on the defendant, not the government, for many crimes.30 There is little
research on the effects of this presumption. However, one study on this
issue found that this federal presumption has contributed to a “massive
increase” in federal pretrial detention and “has become an almost de
facto detention order for almost half of all federal cases.”31
A successful state bill must differ dramatically from the federal model
if the goal is increasing pretrial release.32 Federal pretrial detention rates
are much higher than state detention rates at around 70% federal deten-
tion (versus about 40% state detention) in the last twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2020.33 Under this current structure, the presump-
tion is detention, not release. There are a few exceptions. Washington,
D.C. presumes release for crimes except murder and assault with the in-
tent to kill,34 releasing more than 90% of defendants with extremely low
rearrest rates while on release.35 Illinois’s recent bail reform, the Pretrial
a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device . . .,
or any other dangerous weapon, or involves a failure to register . . .;” or if the defendant
poses a serious risk of flight, obstruction of justice, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimi-
date a prospective witness or juror. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
30. Once the presumption of detention is raised, the defendant has the burden to pro-
duce evidence to rebut both that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.
United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988). If the defendant produces suffi-
cient evidence, the government bears the burden of persuasion to prove either the defen-
dant’s risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence or his danger to the community by
clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The government must establish only
one of these potential instances, while the defendant must produce evidence to rebut both.
Further, this presumption does not function like the typical rebuttable “‘bursting bubble’
presumption”; the defendant’s production of evidence does not burst or eliminate the re-
buttable presumption. Instead, “it remains in the case as an evidentiary finding militating
against release, to be weighed along with other evidence relevant to factors listed in
§ 3142(g).” United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, the defen-
dant has no true opportunity to rebut the presumption by producing evidence.
31. Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release
Rates, 81 FED. PROB. J. 52, 61 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
81_2_7_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8Q4-SBDZ]. “[W]hen clearly defined, the presumption
focuses primarily on drug offenses and excludes the majority of violent, sex, or weapons-
related offenses.” Id. at 62. Due to the rise in drug prosecutions alone, “at least 42 percent
of all federal cases in any given year are now subject to the presumption.” Id. Conse-
quently, the number of federal defendants detained pretrial has dramatically increased,
“reaching as high as 59 percent in [2016], after excluding immigration cases.” Id.
32. SCHNACKE, supra note 29, at 17 (“[B]ail defined as a process of release is the only
definition that allows jurisdictions to re-articulate their release and detention processes
without confusion . . . most of that confusion comes from the fact that many people (in-
deed, many courts and legislatures) define bail by one of its conditions – money.”).
33. Table H-14: Pretrial Services Release and Detention For the 12-Month Period End-
ing September 30, 2020, U.S. DIST. CTS. (Sep. 30, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/data_tables/jb_h14_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSL3-DSBX] (indicating
that 52,002 of 73,647 cases resulted in detention without release); see also sources cited
supra note 13.
34. D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1322(e)(2) (West 2017) (if not charged with first- or second-
degree murder or assault with the intent to kill a person is “released on personal recogni-
zance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . released on a condition
[or] . . . temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release or detained” (only
after a hearing); see also id. § 23-1322(b).
35. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 7, at 3 (noting Washington, D.C. releases 92%
defendants pretrial). San Francisco provides another effective reform model. The city be-
gan using a validated risk assessment tool, implemented a pretrial diversion program, and
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Fairness Act (the Illinois Act), also presumes release rather than deten-
tion for misdemeanor offenses.36 Additionally, although felony arrests re-
sult in appearance before the court, the Illinois Act provides that the
prosecution must file a verified petition with the court for defendants to
have a detention hearing.37 The Illinois Act also requires the government
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a person is not eligible for
release.38 Putting the onus on the government to demand release is likely
to increase pretrial release rates in Illinois. New Jersey’s law, which be-
came effective in 2017, also applies similar procedural safeguards to pro-
vide presumption in the right direction by allowing release before or at
the defendant’s first appearance, unless the prosecutor files a motion of
detention.39 The ABA Pretrial Release standards also dictate that release
eliminated cash bail. The city’s jail population decreased by 47% and its new criminal ac-
tivity rate is 10%. See Tiana Herring, Releasing People Pretrial Doesn’t Harm Public Safety,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/11/17/
pretrial-releases [https://perma.cc/JLN3-PAQK]. A key component to its success may also
be a well-funded, active pretrial services agency.
36. Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 110-2(a) (Ill.
2021) (“It is presumed that a defendant is entitled to release on personal recognizance on
the condition that the defendant attend all required court proceedings and the defendant
does not commit any criminal offense, and complies with all terms of pretrial release”); id.
§ 110-4(a) (“All persons charged with an offense shall be eligible for pretrial release before
conviction. Pretrial release may only be denied when a person is charged with an offense
listed in Section 110-6.1 or when the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight, and
after the court has held a hearing under Section 110-6.1.”); id. § 109-1(a-3) (stating that
“[a] person arrested with or without a warrant for an offense for which pretrial release may
not be denied may, except as otherwise provided in this Code, be released by the officer
without appearing before a judge” (emphasis added)). While this does create a presump-
tion for release, section 109-3 slightly limits the presumption by requiring the judge to
“hold the defendant to answer to the court having jurisdiction of the offense if from the
evidence it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by
the defendant . . . if the offense is a felony.” Id. § 109-3(a). In contrast to the Illinois bill, a
Delaware bill that became effective on July 30, 2021 had the opportunity to allow for re-
lease on personal recognizance, but failed to do so. The bill continues to allow for bail to
be posted on individuals who are arrested and charged for any crime other than a capital
crime. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2105–2107.
37. Id. § 109-1(b) (“Upon initial appearance of a person before the court, the judge
shall . . . admit the defendant to pretrial release in accordance with the provisions of Arti-
cle 110/5 of this Code, or upon verified petition of the State, proceed with the setting of a
detention hearing as provided in Section 110-6.1 . . . ”).
38. Id. § 110-6.1(e) (“All defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release,
and the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that: (1)
the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an offense
listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) and, (2) the defendant poses a real
and present threat to the safety of a specific, identifiable person or persons, by conduct
which may include, but is not limited to, a forcible felony, the obstruction of justice, intimi-
dation, injury, or abuse as defined by paragraph (1) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986 and, (3) no condition or combination of conditions set forth in sub-
section (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate the real and present threat to the
safety of any person or persons or the defendant’s willful flight.”).
39. See N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 11; 2014 N.J. Laws ch. 31; N.J. CT. R. 3:1 to :4A. It reads:
Under CJR, prosecutors may seek to detain defendants charged on a com-
plaint-warrant without the opportunity for release. Pretrial detention mo-
tions are limited to indictable charges and domestic violence related
disorderly persons charges. The prosecution has the burden to demonstrate
that no combination of conditions or level of monitoring is sufficient to rea-
sonably assure the safety of the community. If the prosecutor files a deten-
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should be the presumption.40 Effective state pretrial reform allows a pre-
sumption of release for all but a select few forcible felony defendants. To
rebut the presumption of release, the government should be required to
demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence (or another substan-
tial standard of proof) that the defendant poses an unmitigated threat to
specific individuals and must be detained.
The ULC Act is somewhat similar to the Illinois Act in the procedural
framework that it sets for release. Like the Illinois Act, the ULC Act
prohibits the arrest of individuals for misdemeanors and non-criminal of-
fenses in certain situations.41 Additionally, both acts allow for release af-
ter arrest without judicial hearing, subject to the discretion of the
authorized official who made the arrest.42 The ULC Act also provides
tion motion, a Superior Court judge holds a pretrial detention hearing—
usually within three to five days of the filing—so that both the prosecution
and defense can present evidence. If the court orders a defendant detained,
CJR’s speedy trial law sets specific timeframes that require the case to pro-
ceed to indictment and trial. If those timeframes are not met, the defendant
can be released from jail.
GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLA-
TURE 34 (2019), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?cTAP [https://
perma.cc/77P2-3ZXL]. For a visual guide of New Jersey’s pretrial detention, see Criminal
Justice Reform: A Step-by-Step Guide, N.J. JUDICIARY, https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/
criminal/cjrstepbystep.pdf?c=IAZ [https://perma.cc/85NJ-TLN5].
40. The ABA specifically lists “detention as an exception to policy favoring release”
and “limit[s] the circumstances under which pretrial detention may be authorized and pro-
vide procedural safeguards to govern pretrial detention proceedings.” See ABA, PRETRIAL
RELEASE, AT STANDARD 10-1.6 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publi-
cations/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk/#10-1.6
[https://perma.cc/4JTK-C5FP]. The ABA establishes “specific criteria and procedures for
effecting the pretrial detention of certain defendants after the court determines that these
defendants pose a substantial risk of flight, or threat to the safety of the community, vic-
tims or witnesses or to the integrity of the justice process. The status of detained defend-
ants should be monitored and their eligibility for release should be reviewed throughout
the adjudication period. The cases of detained defendants should be given priority in
scheduling for trial.” Id.
41. ULC Act, supra note 18, § 201(c) (“If an offense under subsection (b)(2) is [a
misdemeanor or non-criminal offense] [punishable by not more than [six months] in jail or
prison], [an authorized official] may not arrest the individual unless: (1) the offense is [in-
sert the offenses or offense types for which the state chooses to authorize arrest]; (2) the
individual fails to provide adequate identification, orally or through documentation, as
lawfully requested by [the authorized official]; (3) the individual is in violation of a condi-
tion or order of probation, [parole], or release; or (4) [the authorized official] reasonably
believes arrest is necessary to: (A) safely conclude [the authorized official’s] interaction
with the individual; (B) carry out a lawful investigation; (C) protect a person from signifi-
cant harm; or (D) prevent the individual from fleeing the jurisdiction.”); Public Act 101-
0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 109-1(a-1) (Ill. 2021) (“Law enforcement
shall issue a citation in lieu of custodial arrest, upon proper identification, for those ac-
cused of traffic and Class B and C criminal misdemeanor offenses, or of petty and business
offenses, who pose no obvious threat to the community or any person, or who have no
obvious medical or mental health issues that pose a risk to their own safety.”).
42. Compare ULC Act, supra note 18, § 203 (“[An authorized official] may release an
individual after arrest and without a release hearing by issuing a [citation] under Section
201(a). [The authorized official] may require the individual to execute an unsecured ap-
pearance bond as a condition of release.”), with Public Act 101-0652 § 109-1(a-3) (“A per-
son arrested with or without a warrant for an offense for which pretrial release may not be
denied may . . . be released by the officer without appearing before a judge . . . A presump-
tion in favor of pretrial release shall by applied by an arresting officer in the exercise of his
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that individuals who are not released from the police station “[have] a
right to be heard at a release hearing” where release is required unless
“the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the individ-
ual is likely to abscond, not appear, obstruct justice, violate an order of
protection, or cause significant harm to another person.”43
Despite the improvements from the federal system, which presumes
detention, it is unclear whether the ULC Act will actually result in a pre-
sumption of release considering the discretion given to arresting officers
and judges.44 Additionally, the ULC Act could take additional steps to
strengthen the presumption of release by requiring the prosecution to file
a motion for detention, similar to the statutes in New Jersey and Illinois.45
II. REPRESENTATION AT PRETRIAL RELEASE (BAIL)
HEARING
Representation by legal counsel (or appropriate proxy)46 for arrested
persons at bail hearings (including release and detention hearings) is criti-
cal and should be mandatory. The justification for representation at a
pretrial hearing includes substantial empirical evidence that pretrial
counsel improves outcomes for defendants.47 Defendants are more likely
to be released and more likely to have a lower bail amount imposed.48
Despite the benefit of legal counsel, substantially less than half of U.S.
jurisdictions require counsel at the pretrial release determination.49 Of
or her discretion under this Section.”). See also ULC Act, supra note 18, § 203 cmt. (per-
mitting “policies and practices of ‘stationhouse release’—or release directly from a police
station, booking facility, jail, or other law enforcement facility—without the need for a
judicial hearing,” though also permitting the “imposition of an unsecured bond” as a condi-
tion of stationhouse release).
43. ULC Act, supra note 18, §§ 302(a), 303.
44. See infra Part VI. Furthermore, the entire citation and release section is optional.
See ULC PRETRIAL RELEASE & DET. ACT: GUIDE FOR ADVOCS. & POLICYMAKERS 6
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020) [hereinafter ULC Guide] (on file with authors) (“Article 2 is
placed entirely in brackets, meaning that it is technically optional for lawmakers. However,
it is our view that Article 2 is an essential aspect of an effective, fair, and efficient system of
pretrial release and detention.”).
45. See GRANT, supra note 39, at 5.
46. Though we are not aware of any jurisdiction that currently allows this, there is a
future possibility of having paralegals or legal practitioners or otherwise trained criminal
justice advocates represent individuals at pretrial hearings under supervision of lawyers.
See, e.g., Licensed Paralegal Practitioner Program, UTAH ST. BAR, https://www.utahbar.org
/licensed-paralegal-practitioner [https://perma.cc/84S7-94AX].
47. See ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 4 (acknowledging that “there is some evidence
that providing counsel could eventually yield overall savings because the presence of coun-
sel is associated with lower rates of detention.”). See generally BAUGHMAN, supra note 4.
48. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 124; see also Colbert, supra note 22, at 803 (“With
representation, data shows that an incarcerated defendant charged with a nonviolent crime
stands five times as likely to be released on recognizance or affordable bail than an unrep-
resented defendant.”).
49. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 122–24. In 1998, only eight states guaranteed counsel
at initial bail hearings and nineteen states denied representation. Colbert, supra note 22, at
796, 798 & n.19. In 2011, eleven states provided representation in most counties and nine
states denied representation. Id. at 798 & n.19; see also John P. Gross, The Right to Counsel
but Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of State Criminal Procedures for Pre-Trial Re-
lease, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831, 841 (2017) (examining the right for indigent defendants to have
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those states that require counsel at initial appearance, many do not re-
quire counsel at the bail determination, which often happens at an earlier
and quicker hearing. If the jurisdiction does not require representation at
the bail determination, it should adopt a mandated release program. Such
a program would make release the default, unless the government dem-
onstrates with clear and convincing evidence that the person presents a
substantial and specific risk of violence.
The ULC Act recognizes but does not require representation in pre-
trial release hearings. The ULC Act notes that previous pretrial detention
reform efforts have included merely some court “recognition of a right to
counsel at any proceeding that could result in detention.”50 The ULC Act
does the same, as it only guarantees the right to representation for de-
tained individuals, but not arrested individuals. In section 402(a), the
ULC Act acknowledges that the “detained individual has a right to coun-
sel” and provides that “[an authorized agency] shall provide counsel” for
indigent individuals.51 The ULC Act does give states the option of incor-
porating the right to arrested individuals before detention.52
While moving closer to a requirement for representation in pretrial bail
hearings, the ULC Act still leaves an option open for states to allow indi-
viduals to remain unrepresented at the defendant’s initial release hear-
ing.53 An optimal bail bill allows representation for all defendants at
counsel and finding that “in thirty-two states, counsel for indigent defendants is not physi-
cally present at the initial appearance”).
50. ULC Act, supra note 18, at Prefatory Note: The Need for the Act (citing Valdez-
Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 460 P.3d 976 (Nev. 2020); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp.
3d 296 (E.D. La. 2018); In re Humphrey, 19 Cal. App. 5th 1006 (Ct. App. 2018); Brangan v.
Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949 (Mass. 2017)).
51. ULC Act, supra note 18, § 402(a).
52. Id. § 302. If adopted by a state, section 302(a)-(b) would give “an arrested individ-
ual [the] right to counsel at a release hearing” and provide that counsel be appointed by an
authorized agency “[i]f the individual is unable to obtain counsel for the hearing.”
53. The comments to section 302 explain the approach taken by the ULC and why it
differs from the right to counsel given in section 402(a). The ULC states that the option for
states to determine whether they will provide a right to representation in release hearings
stems from a lack of legal certainty as to “whether a release hearing is a ‘critical stage’ of
the prosecution.” Id. § 302 cmt.; see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
In that case, the Court clarified that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a
judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restric-
tion, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel,” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213, but the court reserved judgment
on “the scope of an individual’s post-attachment right to the presence of counsel,” id. at
212 n.15. The comments from the ULC Act also cite to various cases from state and lower
federal courts to show instances where “courts have recently held that an arrested individ-
ual has a right to representation if an initial appearance could result in continued deten-
tion.” ULC Act, supra note 18, § 302 cmt. However, the ULC recognizes that “many
jurisdictions do not currently provide counsel at initial appearances where release and de-
tention determinations are made.” Id. On the other hand, the comments to section 402
allow for the right of representation pursuant to “the procedural framework for detention
hearings that the Supreme Court endorsed in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987).” Id. § 402 cmt. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that states will choose to incorporate
a right to counsel for all early pretrial hearings based on the ULC Act. The ULC acknowl-
edges this foreseeable outcome and the undesirable consequences. ULC Guide, supra note
44, at 4 (“We know that in many States, the main objection to providing counsel will be
fiscal . . . .”); id. at 2 (“[T]he Act leaves many crucial points to state discretion—points that,
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every pretrial hearing,54 and if the government does not provide repre-
sentation, allows presumptive release for the majority of defendants from
the police station.55
III. CAREFUL PRETRIAL DATA TRACKING
Although data can be dangerous and may sometimes allow racial bias,
rejecting data altogether creates worse outcomes. Judges should have
pretrial reports and risk assessments, including data on outcomes in cases
where the default is not release.56 Identifying key metrics and tracking
detention data, such as arrest rates and detention length, can mold more
accurate pretrial reports.57 Pretrial reports can be a helpful tool in assess-
ing the seriousness of threat that a defendant poses upon release, particu-
larly for forcible felony defendants.58 Objective criteria can assist judges
in better predicting pretrial, post-release crime. Without data-based risk
instruments, judges may rely on intuition or gut instinct,59 which are typi-
cally wrong when predicting pretrial crime.60 Judges’ perceptions may
also be impacted by implicit bias, and despite similarities with past cases,
judges are not bound by those decisions in current bail determinations.61
from an equity and liberty perspective, could represent the distinction between a good bill
and a bill worth opposing.”).
54. See ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 10 (“We also recommend fighting hard to have
counsel also made available at the initial release hearing, which some (but not all) courts
have indicated is constitutionally required.”); id. at 8 (“We believe that the release hearing
is a critical stage, meaning that all arrested individuals must have appointed counsel at the
hearing . . . . [W]e recommend that jurisdictions remove all brackets in Section 302.”).
55. See id. at 4 (acknowledging that many states’ main objection to providing counsel
will be fiscal, and in such case, those states should include the ULC Act’s citation and
release section to ensure that this legal need is met); id. at 8 (“[T]he fiscal burden of pro-
viding counsel can be reduced if Article 2 is included and results in increased use of cita-
tions instead of bookings.”).
56. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 195 (discussing the use of risk assessment tools to
inform decision-making pretrial); see also Colbert, supra note 48, at 802 (“[A] judge’s re-
lease order receives validation when defendants return to court and comply with condi-
tions of release. Public defenders and assigned panel lawyers should make a practice of
providing judges with the follow-up information, which could be disseminated to the pub-
lic-at-large to dispel the myth that released defendants fail to reappear or commit new
crimes.”).
57. SCHNACKE, supra note 29, at 36–37 (“[U]sing actuarial pretrial risk assessment in-
struments is a more rational way to glean whether a defendant poses some extreme risk
than by merely assuming high risk for serious charges.”).
58. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 41 (“Pretrial reports are extremely helpful to provide
an independent assessment to evaluate how likely a prisoner is to flee or commit a crime if
released. In the District of Columbia, these reports have been considered quite successful
at predicting the risk of releasing any given defendant.”).
59. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 553; see also Open Letter from James
Austin, supra note 25 (“Evaluation of risk is a fundamental component of pretrial release
decisions and will occur with or without the implementation of PRAIs. Objective and valid
PRAIs are a more efficient, transparent, and fairer basis for making that assessment than a
judge haphazardly and quickly scanning a myriad of documents. The benchmark here is
not perfection but rather improving upon unaided human judgment, which is universally
acknowledged to introduce racial and other biases.”).
60. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 70.
61. See Amanda Woog, What to Do When Judges Routinely Violate Constitutional
Law, 74 SMU L. REV. 475, 480 (2021).
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Additionally, new research by Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson
shows that judges may not rely on the risk assessment tools even when
they are available.62
Though much research still supports the use of risk assessments for
providing critical data and improving detention outcomes,63 risk assess-
ments and pretrial reports should pay careful attention not to include ra-
cially inequitable factors. These factors may include the defendant’s zip
code, education level, job history, income, marriage status, and whether
the defendant owns a home or cell phone.64 New research indicates that
risk assessment tools that use these factors can build in or perpetuate
racial or socioeconomic bias.65 Race-correlated factors in risk assessment
tools (such as criminal record, socioeconomic factors, and neighborhood-
related factors) should be carefully reviewed each year to ensure they are
not perpetuating racial bias.66
Pretrial information provided to judges should be primarily based on
objective factors that consider risk of violent crime such as criminal his-
tory of three or more violent felonies.67 Dangerousness and flight risk
62. Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of
Liberty, U. VA. SCH. L. 51 (Feb. 16, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3787018# [https://perma.cc/4B78-6MH4] (explaining that “bail magistrates seem
to be engaged in a mental and moral calculus that is something other than a technical
evaluation of risk” and that “[t]hey ignore the recommendations associated with the risk
assessment more often than not, and use fades over time”).
63. See Open Letter from James Austin, supra note 25 (discussing the fact that the vast
majority of defendants released 75%–85% will not be rearrested or fail to appear at their
next court hearing due to risk assessment instruments); Evan M. Lowder, Bradley R. Ray
& Eric L. Grommon, Improving the Accuracy and Fairness of Pretrial Release Decisions: A
Multi-Site Study of Risk Assessments Implemented in Four Counties, Indiana, 2015-2018,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2020), https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2018-r2-cx-0023 [https://
perma.cc/M8YU-YY2B] (showing better outcomes where risk assessments are used com-
pared to no risk assessments and show decreases in detention rates); see also Baradaran &
McIntyre, supra note 24, at 553. See generally Evan M. Lowder, Carmen L. Diaz, Eric
Grommon & Bradley R. Ray, Effects of Pretrial Risk Assessments on Release Decisions and
Misconduct Outcomes Relative to Practice as Usual, 73 J. CRIM. JUST. (forthcoming Oct.
2021) (finding pretrial risk assessments can facilitate non-financial release and structured
guidelines may help maximize pretrial release while minimizing conduct).
64. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 72. For instance, Colorado’s risk assessment that im-
properly considers factors accounts for the socioeconomic status of a defendant—including
owning a house, making residential payments, and paying rent. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-1-103, 16-1-104, 16-4-103(3)(b) (West 2013).
65. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 72 (“[R]isk assessments can be racially inequitable by
giving more weight to certain factors that . . . are racially disparate.”); PRETRIAL JUST.
INST., THE CASE AGAINST PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 2–3 (2020), https://
university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocu-
mentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7a99ffae-f435-4645-5748-4dab1cc56653&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/J2DQ-UL36] (arguing that pretrial risk assessment instruments do not
accurately predict behavior of people released pretrial and are racially biased against
Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and low-income people and increase disparities in jails where
implemented).
66. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 199; see also Kristin Bechtel, Christopher T.
Lowenkamp & Alex Holsinger, Identifying the Predictors of Pretrial Failure: A Meta-Anal-
ysis, 75 FED. PROB. 78, 87 (2011).
67. See generally JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMS (2003), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bja/199773.pdf [https://
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should be evaluated and considered separately, rather than merged into
one analysis.68 Making the instrument available to the public can increase
transparency in the risk assessment process.69 The information that may
be helpful in making pretrial decisions includes: (1) information on the
original arrest for a violent crime, (2) whether the defendant has four or
more prior convictions, (3) prior incarceration, (4) active criminal justice
status, and (5) the age of the defendant.70 The risk of rearrest, especially
for violent crime, should be the primary consideration and should be
based on evidence.71 Individuals with prior jail time are generally at a
higher risk for committing crimes if released.72 Individuals charged with
public order offenses, white-collar crime, and drug offenses (both traf-
ficking and possession) as well as older defendants (over forty) are very
unlikely to commit a violent crime pretrial.73 Women are also at a lower
risk for pretrial crime.74 While many risk assessment tools are available,
the best ones are tailored to the specific jurisdiction and should rely on
local data for their creation and validation.75 An evaluation of racial bias
should be conducted each year to make sure that the risk instrument does
not perpetuate bias on the basis of race or other classification.
The ULC Act is agnostic about whether states should use risk assess-
ment instruments.76 However, as states continue to work toward reform,
proper use of risk assessment tools would favor the default for pretrial
release. Additionally, for defendants who are charged with forcible felo-
nies, relevant pretrial information relied on by judges would focus release
decisions on the criteria that matter and set conditions for release that
mitigate substantial risks. This data-informed model should not replace
efforts to increase the amount of time courts dedicate to making individ-
ual bail decisions.77 Nor should it favor efficiency at the expense of de-
fendants’ constitutional rights.78
perma.cc/Q7AU-X66J]; BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 72–75 (“[T]he best practice for re-
lease officials is to combine an objective, actuarial risk assessment with a limited subjective
assessment”).
68. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L.
REV. 837, 871.
69. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 71.
70. Id. at 90.
71. See id. at 63 (“[D]efendants charged with fraud, public order offenses and drug
defendants have extremely low rearrest rates for violent crimes.”).
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 192.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 195.
76. See ULC Act, supra note 18, § 303 cmt. (“This Act neither requires nor prohibits
the use of actuarial risk assessment instruments. Jurisdictions may decide not to use such
tools, or they may use actuarial instruments and direct or authorize courts to consider
statistical risk assessments as ‘other relevant information’ under Section 303(3).”).
77. Carroll, supra note 22, at 157.
78. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 553.
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IV. NO DETENTION FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR
A pretrial detention bill should not detain individuals for failure to ap-
pear. It is crucial to distinguish between nonappearance and flight in de-
fining the proper grounds for pretrial detention.79 As Lauren Gouldin has
pointed out, grounds for pretrial detention should be based on whether
an individual is truly a flight risk, rather than another non-absconding
nonappearance.80 Those who simply fail to appear should be provided
reminders and other services to help them appear in court. They should
not be detained for failure to appear if there is no evidence of flight.
The ULC Act distinguishes between failure to appear and absconding
but does not prohibit detention for failure to appear.81 The ULC Act
permits courts to take further action “[i]f an individual absconds or does
not appear as required.”82 This should be permitted only for absconding
nonappearances, not simple failures to appear. If a released individual
fails to appear for a court date, and has not fled or absconded on purpose,
the jurisdiction should use practical measures to get the individual into
court.83 For example, some pretrial services agencies send court date re-
minders via text, email, or postcard,84 with some doing this in descending
79. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 22, at 685 (“[A]s release rates rise with
the implementation of reform, rates of nonappearance will also rise. The sustainability of
reform depends on maintaining acceptable appearance rates.”).
80. Id.
81. Compare ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 6 (“Throughout the Act, the text is careful
to distinguish two different concepts: nonappearance and flight.”), with id. (“The individual
poses a relevant risk [to pretrial release] only if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual is likely to abscond, not appear, obstruct justice, violate an
order of protection, or cause significant harm to another person.”).
82. ULC Act, supra note 18, § 204(b). The comment clarifies that section 204(b) “calls
upon a state to designate what a court is authorized to do if an individual does not appear
as required by a citation. Options may include allowing a court to issue a summons (or its
equivalent) or an arrest warrant or to take some other action or combination of actions
consistent with the law of the state, other than this Act.” Id. § 204 cmt.
83. ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 10 (“We believe that pretrial detention should not
be available to address non-appearance (because less restrictive conditions should always
be able to address a mere non-appearance risk).”).
84. See Request for Proposals to Conduct Research on Improving Pretrial Court Ap-
pearance, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. 4 (Dec. 13, 2018), https://craftmediabucket.s3.
amazonaws.com/uploads/RFP-to-Conduct-Research-on-Improving-Court-Appearance-
QA.pdf [https://perma.cc/82AK-M232] (“[C]ourt date notifications continue to have the
greatest impact on court appearance, oftentimes providing as much as 30 to 50 percent
increase in appearance rates,” yet more studies could be done to understand which newer
technologies are most effective to particular sub-groups of defendants.); BRICE COOKE,
BINTA ZAHRA DIOP, ALISSA FISHBANE, JONATHAN HAYES, AURELIE OUSS & ANUJ
SHAH, UNIV. CHI. CRIME LAB USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT 5 (2018), https://
www.ideas42.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Using-Behavioral-Science-to-Improve-Crim-
inal-Justice-Outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ2Y-RQMR] (finding that reminder text
messages reduced failure to appear by 26% in New York City); Maria Elena Cruz, NAT.
CTR. FOR ST. CT., ARIZONA’S TASK FORCE ON FAIR JUSTICE FOR ALL 3–4 (2017), http://
ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/accessfair/id/785 [https://perma.cc/NJ62-XT7H]
(noting reminders reduced failure to appear rates by 23% in Arizona; telephone reminders
significantly reduced failure to appear rates in Jefferson County, Colorado; and postcard
reminders significantly reduced failure to appear rates in Nebraska’s county courts).
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order of the particular defendant’s preferences.85 Others provide trans-
portation services.86
A defendant’s nonappearance could be for a variety of reasons other
than deliberate flight. The problem of failure to appear is typically a fail-
ure of the system, or difficult personal circumstances, rather than a desire
to escape justice.87 Pretrial services agencies could conduct failure-to-ap-
pear investigations into defendants’ nonappearances and use such find-
ings to improve their methods to get defendants into court.88 New York
City, for example, found that defendants who provided a phone number
and address were more likely to appear for their court dates.89 And while
“prior flight risk is predictive of future flight risk,” this is more of a rea-
son for a text reminder, not detention.90 Thus, detention should be per-
mitted only when there is proof of absconding, rather than
nonappearance, or after several varied attempts to get the individual into
court.
V. LACK OF MONEY SHOULD NOT LEAD TO DETENTION
The default for most defendants should be release with no reliance on
money bail. There is no room for commercial bail in an optimal bail sys-
tem.91 The ULC Act section 307(a) directly addresses this issue by clearly
85. See, e.g., PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFI-




86. To increase the likelihood of a defendant’s court appearance, Santa Clara County
sends reminders and offers transportation. Since this reform, only 1% of defendants were
rearrested. See Tiana Herring, Releasing People Pretrial Doesn’t Harm Public Safety,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/11/17/
pretrial-releases [https://perma.cc/N7UK-75RH].
87. See Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 22, at 687, 731 (explaining that re-
search has made clear that a failure to appear is not cause for pretrial detention and that
simple reminders like postcards, calls, and texts can dramatically reduce failure to appear).
88. See, e.g., PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., supra note 85, at 23–24.
89. Corinne Ramey, Algorithm Helps New York Decide Who Goes Free Before Trial,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/algorithm-helps-new-
york-decide-who-goes-free-before-trial-11600610400 [https://perma.cc/LY38-DEYZ].
90. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 69.
91. While money bail—commercial or deposit—should not be used to determine who
obtains release, there are some jurisdictions that do not have the political will to abolish
money bail altogether. As a compromise position, these jurisdictions can remove some of
the negative effects of money bail by relying on deposit bail (sometimes called cash bail)
where the defendant gets their money back upon appearance before trial. BAUGHMAN,
supra note 4, at 46. Judges must ensure that money bail does not discriminate based on
race or socioeconomic status. Finally, bail amounts should reflect not any punitive goals
but the purpose of bail: “to ensure that the accused will appear in court for trial.” Id. at 32.
To accomplish this last point, courts should never rely on a “uniform bail schedule” matrix
or other guidelines to determine how much money bail to set in a particular case. Id. at 47.
These bail schedules that assign a dollar amount for specific charges should be eliminated
as they do not consider an individual’s ability to pay and can allow release based on finan-
cial situation rather than risk. Id. at 206. In addition, money bail should be limited to
forcible felonies, and never be applied to misdemeanor or nonforcible felonies. See Baugh-
man, supra note 1, at 976; Doug Dais, Cash Bail Keeps Poor People in Jail. Here’s How We
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establishing that people should not be detained for inability to pay.92
However, the overall benefit of the clause may not be seen due to the
many factors indicated that allow detention or restrictions to be placed on
an individual without real evidence, as discussed in Parts VI and VII.93
By contrast, the Illinois Act eliminates monetary bail and monetary fines
in many circumstances.94 In addition to scaling back on when monetary
conditions can be placed on defendants, the Illinois Act requires courts to
take into account the defendant’s ability to pay before tacking on the
duty to pay.95
While eliminating money bail is something that almost all criminal jus-
tice experts agree is ideal, the bail insurance industry (commercial bail/
bail bond industry) actively lobbies against reform in this area. When bail
reform is on a state legislature’s agenda, the bail insurance industry sends
a representative to provide industry input.96 This is not a battle of good
or evil, but the commercial bail industry has a bottom line that profits
when more people are arrested and detained because it means that more
bonds are set. Commercial bail agents (and therefore their insurers)
make more money when more individuals are arrested and when bail is
set. Bail agents make more money when higher bail amounts are set. It is
difficult to make decisions on pretrial reform with a lobbying body in the
room. The bail industry has reportedly lobbied sheriffs’ departments, leg-
islatures, and judges to block potentially beneficial bail reforms.97 An
American Bail Coalition representative was included in the ULC com-
mission that drafted the ULC Pretrial Reform Act. There should be a
broader national discussion of whether it serves national interests in crim-
inal justice reform to include organizations whose financial interests are
diametrically opposed to ending mass incarceration.
Fix It, FREETHINK (Aug. 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.freethink.com/videos/bail-reform
[https://perma.cc/5JEZ-Z347].
92. See ULC Act, supra note 18, § 307(a).
93. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
94. Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 110-1.5, 110-
10(b) (Ill. 2021). The Act includes monetary fines or fees only when an individual violates
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the Driver License Compact, or the Nonresident
Violator Compact or when the defendant’s release is conditioned on supervision by a pre-
trial service agency or a pretrial home service, both of which require electronic monitoring
(which can also be problematic).
95. Id. § 110-10(b)(14.3) (“The person receiving pretrial services may be ordered to
pay all costs incidental to pretrial services in accordance with his or her ability to pay those
costs.”).
96. See generally BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 157–85.
97. In a study conducted by the National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices
in 2019, the Task Force found that in case studies of six states, “opposition to reform came
from two main sources: the bail industry . . . [and] unwilling legislatures.” See NAT’L TASK
FORCE OF FINES, FEES, & BAIL PRACS., BAIL REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE BASED ON
RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE 72–73 (2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0023/16808/bail-reform-guide-3-12-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCD3-FL6W]; Samuel R.
Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1398–99
(2014) (discussing instances where the bail industry blocked legislation from 2006 to 2010);
VERA INST., supra note 4 (noting that California’s bail reform bill “SB 10 is now on hold
pending a statewide referendum in November 2020 after the bail bond industry success-
fully gathered more than half a million signatures against the new law.”).
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As shown by the changes made in the ULC Act and in Illinois, when
the goal of bail reform is release rather than detention, more can be done
to remove the financial burden placed on defendants who are unable to
pay. Money bail should not be a determining factor for pretrial release.
Pretrial release should be the default, without regard to the wealth of the
defendant and without the input of the commercial bail industry.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS SHOULD PREVENT
PRETRIAL FACT-FINDING
Pretrial reform should not violate constitutional due process of law
principles, including judicial pretrial fact-finding.98 Judges in pretrial
hearings should not be able to consider the weight of the evidence against
a defendant to predict guilt before trial.99 A judge given this ability is put
into a position where they act as a jury, make determinations on the cred-
ibility of various witnesses, and weigh evidence.100 This is especially prob-
lematic when a defendant has no counsel at a pretrial hearing, and these
determinations often happen in a few minutes or less.101 Despite this so-
far unidentified constitutional problem,102 the Bail Reform Act of
1984,103 as well as many state laws, allow judges to “weigh the evidence”
in determining whether to release a defendant pretrial.104 The practical
98. Baughman, supra note 10, at 758–65 (discussing how three justifications for deny-
ing bail have been applied by courts inconsistently to obtain results “due to a disconnect
between the presumption of innocence and the Due Process Clause.”).
99. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 524 (noting that “an ideal pretrial-release
system that respects constitutional protections would leave all fact finding until trial and
not allow judges to make any of these predictions pretrial.”).
100. Shima Baradaran, The Presumption of Punishment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHILOS. 391, 401
(2014) (Changes in state and federal law in the 1960s and 1980s have allowed for judges to
overstep in this manner and “detain defendants because they had determined that they
were likely guilty before they had the opportunity for a trial.”).
101. Sarah Ottone & Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Pretrial Detention and the Decision to
Impose Bail in Southern California, 19 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 24, 33–34
(2018) (noting that in fifteen areas of southern California, most bail hearings are short and
uncontested); Carroll, supra note 22, at 148 n.18.
102. As far as we know, Baradaran’s work alone has identified the problem with pre-
trial fact-finding and “weighing” of evidence pretrial. See Baradaran, supra note 100, at
401; Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 515.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2008) (“The judicial officer shall, in determining whether
there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community, take into account the
available information concerning . . . (2) the weight of the evidence against the person”).
104. See, e.g., Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 110-
5(a)(2) (Ill. 2021) (“In determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, which will
reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other
person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the
conditions of pretrial release, the court shall, on the basis of available information, take
into account such matters as . . . (2) the weight of the evidence against the eligible defen-
dant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any evidence sought to be
excluded . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(4)(i) (West 2019) (“The pretrial detention order
of the court shall be based solely upon evidence produced at the hearing and shall contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support it.”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(e)(2)
(West 2017) (“The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of
release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety
of any other person and the community, take into account information available concern-
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result of the pretrial weighing that is sanctioned by federal and state stat-
utes105 is not only the costs of detention,106 but also the violation of due
process that implicates a defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence,
particularly pretrial.107
The proposed ULC Act allows for judges to continue to act in this pre-
trial fact-finding role.108 Section 303(1)(B) of the ULC’s proposal allows
for the court to consider “available information concerning . . . the weight
of the evidence against the individual” to determine risk at a release
hearing.109 The ULC leaves these procedural rights up to state law for
release hearings.110 However, most states allow for judges to weigh evi-
dence against defendants before trial when determining whether to re-
lease them on bail.111 Additionally, pursuant to Article 4 of the ULC Act,
“the court shall consider the criteria in Section 303[,]”112 and the individ-
ual has a right to present evidence, call witnesses, testify,113 and cross-
examine witnesses in detention hearings.114 In other words, the pretrial
and detention hearings become a few minute-long trials without juries,
usually conducted without counsel.
The recently drafted Illinois Act also allows for judges to consider the
weight of the evidence against the defendant when making decisions of
release and when setting conditions on release if it is granted.115 Despite
the Illinois Act’s efforts to prevent a pretrial detention hearing from lim-
iting a defendant’s presumption of innocence,116 it gives judges “broader
discretion to determine whether those accused of crimes pose a danger to
a specific person or the community at large and whether they are likely to
ing . . . (2) [t]he weight of the evidence against the person . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-
20(b) (West 2021) (“In determining in a pretrial detention hearing whether no amount of
monetary bail, non-monetary conditions or combination of monetary bail and conditions
would reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the
protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the eligible defen-
dant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, the court may
take into account information concerning . . . (b) [t]he weight of the evidence against the
eligible defendant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any evidence
sought to be excluded. . . ”); see also Baughman, supra note 10, at 753 (explaining how the
Bail Reform Act allows a judge to weigh the evidence against a defendant in determining
release).
105. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 524; Baradaran, supra note 100, at 401.
106. Baradaran, supra note 100, at 401.
107. Id. at 401–02; see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 111 (“This is information that
should not be offered this early on in the trial – where usually defense counsel is not even
present – and because it ultimately eliminates a defendant’s constitutional right of a pre-
sumption of innocence.”).
108. ULC Act, supra note 18, at §§ 303, 403(a).
109. Id. § 303(1)(B).
110. Id. § 302 cmt.
111. See Baradaran, supra note 100, at 401 (“[J]udges in most jurisdictions in the
United States are weighing evidence against defendants before trial in order to determine
whether to release them on bail.”).
112. ULC Act, supra note 18, at § 403(a).
113. Id. § 402(b)(2)–(3).
114. Id. § 402(b)(4).
115. Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 110-5(a)(2),
110-6.1(f)(6) (Ill. 2021).
116. Id. § 110-6.1(l).
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show up in court without being held in jail.”117
To combat this issue, a model bail bill should limit presentation or the
weighing of evidence at a pretrial detention hearing. Prosecutors should
not be allowed to present information regarding the defendant’s guilt or
innocence at initial hearings where bail determinations are made.118 Since
the default for most crimes is release, information should only be
presented in pretrial hearings when there is a forcible felony, evidence of
prior violent crime convictions, and threats to a specific individual in or-
der to assess whether the defendant poses too great an unmitigated “dan-
ger to the community” to be released pretrial.119 This shift will refocus
the purpose of bail to its original intent—to ensure that defendants return
to court for trial120—and reestablish the protections of due process and
the presumption of innocence in our criminal system.121
VII. NARROW DETENTION NETS
An optimal state bail system defaults to release for most crimes and
has a very narrow detention net.122 Most defendants charged with a crime
117. Dan Petrella, Gov. J.B. Pritzker Signs Sweeping Illinois Criminal Justice Overhaul,
Which Will End Cash Bail Starting in 2023, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 2021, 5:42 PM), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-jb-pritzker-criminal-justice-bill-20210222-
nw7lh3upy5aipap2odh7jaofke-story.html [https://perma.cc/V8DZ-YV8Q]. The Illinois Act
does make significant changes by limiting the crimes and circumstances for which pretrial
detention may be considered. However, in a detention hearing, judges may have evidence
presented to them from both the state and the defendant. Public Act 101-0652 § 110-
6.1(f)(1). The defendant has the right to counsel and can testify, present witnesses, and
cross-examine witnesses called by the state. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(3). Additionally, the rules of
evidence do not apply to “the presentation and consideration of information at the hear-
ing” and “[t]he defendant may not move to suppress evidence or a confession” at this
stage. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(5)–(6). The judge then makes a determination on the question of
detention taking into consideration “the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged[,]” “the weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant[,]” and “the history
and characteristics of the eligible defendant” (including but not limited to physical, mental
and emotional characteristics, and criminal history, etc.). Id. § 110-5(a)(1)–(3). In essence,
the hearing becomes a bench trial where the defendant may not be represented, and the
judge has wide latitude to impose detention before the actual trial.
118. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 111 (“[N]ow at initial hearings, prosecutors present
information about the crime defendant is charged with, some evidence regarding these
charges, and whether bail should be set or, in some cases, why bail should not be offered at
all. . . . This is information that should not be offered this early on in the trial . . . because it
ultimately eliminates a defendant’s constitutional right of a presumption of innocence.”).
119. Baughman, supra note 10, at 772.
120. Id. at 731 (citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (holding that the sole
purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial); Barret v. Lewis, 1 Mart.
(o.s.) 189, 192 (La. 1810) (“Bail is required in this territory for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff from the flight of the defendant and for no other purpose. It is the same in
England.”)).
121. Id. at 770.
122. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 214 (“[A]n optimal bail system in America . . . would
release a larger number of safe indigent defendants . . .”); ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 10
(recommending that a net should not be larger than the constitutional net in California,
which is limited to serious felonies and some limited misdemeanors); see also PRETRIAL
JUST. INST., supra note 65, at 11 (“The focus should be on implementing a very narrow
detention net and providing robust detention hearings that honor the charge of the Su-
preme Court forty years ago.”).
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should be released on their own recognizance from the police station
(before a hearing) and should appear in court at a later point. A narrow
detention net must establish a presumption in favor of release on recogni-
zance for most defendants.123 This would, of course, mean that almost all
misdemeanor and most felony defendants are released before trial. Indi-
viduals who are charged with forcible felonies and have a previous crimi-
nal history of violent crime should appear at a hearing before obtaining
release.124 If constitutional principles of due process are followed, there
should be no limits to pretrial liberty unless they are necessary to ensure
a fair trial.125 A model detention net must set aggressive release goals and
allow detention only where the government proves, by substantial bur-
den, that a defendant is unable to be safely released.126 It must also cre-
ate benchmarks for those release goals, like 90% release, rather than
simply leaving the numbers to chance.127 To put it bluntly, “Misdemean-
123. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 43 (“Release on recognizance provides an assurance
to judges that certain defendants will not be held in pretrial detention. This assurance can-
not be guaranteed with any other form of release because of the economic standing of
many defendants.”). But “[t]he Act does not stipulate what charges should be eligible for
detention.” ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 5.
124. Misdemeanor defendants should only be detained for the amount of time that they
pose a substantial risk to the safety of specific individuals, proven by government by clear
and convincing evidence. An example of such cases includes domestic violence or cases of
driving while under the influence of illicit drugs. See, e.g., VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(c) (stating that
law enforcement may not issue a citation when misdemeanor is assault against family mem-
ber, violation of court order, violation of foreign abuse prevention order, misdemeanor
offense against vulnerable adult, DUI after prior conviction, violation of hate-motivated
crime injunction, violation of condition of release, stalking, simple assault, recklessly en-
dangering another person, failure to register as sex offender, or cruelty to a child); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-74(A)(2) (West 2019) (stating that law enforcement may not issue a
summons for DUIs, minors driving after consuming alcohol); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-
5a(1) (West 2021) (stating that law enforcement may not issue citations for misdemeanors
involving injury to the person); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085(8) (West 2017) (stating that law
enforcement may not issue citations in domestic abuse cases).
125. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 188 (“[P]retrial restraints of liberty should be limited
to only what is necessary and only where there is a proper legal basis” such as “ensuring a
person’s attendance at trial and protecting the judicial process from interference by
defendant.”).
126. “When pursuing charges is necessary, prosecutors should presume that they should
recommend people are released before trial without conditions and alternative-to-prison
sentencing options upon conviction, such as community service or probation.” Nicole
Zayas Fortier, Unfettered, Unchecked, Unopposed: The Need for Accountability and Limits,
in CAN THEY DO THAT? UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 25, 38 (Melba V.
Pearson ed., 2020). It is not enough for prosecutors to refrain from making these favorable
recommendations. See Colbert, supra note 48, at 801 (explaining that pretrial detention
reform suffered when “[a]t initial appearances, prosecutors refrained from making
favorable recommendations for pretrial release” and instead “chose the ‘neutral’ path and
took no position, stating only that ‘the People submit’ and leaving it for the judge to
decide.”).
127. Jurisdictions rarely distinguish between misdemeanor and felony defendants in
bail reform risk assessments. See Baughman, supra note 1, at 1021; Shima Baradaran
Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 872 (2018) (“Misde-
meanor defendants are detained before trial almost as often as felony defendants because
they cannot afford bail.”). Eliminating or decreasing the use of misdemeanor detention is
especially important because such detention “discriminates against the poor and minori-
ties, especially against African Americans, who often have less options to pay for release.”
Id. at 882.
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ors are less serious crimes and should be treated as such.”128 If a state
uses a risk assessment, it should distinguish between detainable forcible
felony and misdemeanor charges.129 But they rarely do.130
If we have learned anything from this or the prior two waves of bail
reform,131 reform efforts do not decrease detention unless they set a nar-
row detention net.132 Setting a target benchmark for release is necessary
to reduce pretrial detention rates. Risk assessments do not independently
guarantee certain or higher release rates. Neither do pretrial services,
money bail, or any other bail reform measure.
To illustrate this point, compare Washington, D.C.’s pretrial outcomes
with those of Kentucky and Virginia. All three jurisdictions rely on pre-
trial risk instruments. Yet D.C. provides the best example of a narrow
detention net: the jurisdiction prohibits release only for murder and as-
sault with intent to kill and requires a hearing to detain, releasing more
than 90% of defendants pretrial.133 By contrast, while Kentucky and Vir-
ginia have each increased the use of pretrial services and risk assess-
ments, their release rates fall below the risk assessments’
recommendations.134 These results demonstrate that judges vary in their
use of or reliance on risk assessments, and that risk assessments and pre-
trial release services do not necessarily effectuate higher release rates.135
128. Baughman, supra note 1, at 984; see also Ex parte Smith, 493 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973).
129. Baughman, supra note 1, 1014–20 (providing examples of Kentucky, Utah, New
Jersey, and Colorado).
130. See generally Dais, supra note 91.
131. Alexa Van Brunt and Locke Bowman have pointed out that in “jurisdictions where
financial conditions have become less central to the pretrial process (a key tenet of recent
reforms), the balance has tipped toward a greater acceptance of preventive detention,”
which has not reduced detention rates. Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward A
Just Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next,
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 709, 759 (2018) (noting bail reform advocates pro-
mote “the government’s right to enforce risk-based incarceration in exchange for the elimi-
nation of cash bail.”)
132. Id. at 708 (arguing that the current trends of bail reforms will “widen the net of
detention by failing to fully eradicate the traditional money bail system while also encour-
aging more intentional forms of preventive detention”); see ULC Guide, supra note 44, at
5 (“In any jurisdiction . . . the discussion should center on what the net should include, not
whether one should exist. [D]etention eligibility nets are essential pieces of pretrial policy,
serving to further limit pretrial detention. Advocates must press for a narrow net . . . .”).
133. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 45 (“Under the DC system, defendants are classi-
fied as high, medium, or low risk according to points on a thirty-eight-factor instrument.”);
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 7, at 3 (noting Washington, D.C. releases 92% defend-
ants pretrial). D.C. also relies on a risk assessment instrument for assessing risk and pro-
hibits cash bail completely. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (West 2017).
134. Baughman, supra note 1, at 1014–16; see Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L.
Doleac, The Roadblock to Reform, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 5 (Nov. 2018), https://
www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RoadblockToReformReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZER5-GX4N] (noting that Kentucky’s pretrial release rate for low and moder-
ate-risk defendants would have been 37% higher if judges had followed the risk assessment
recommendations).
135. Baughman, supra note 1, at 1014–16 (explaining that the risk assessment tools used
in Kentucky and Virginia were not successful in reducing incarceration rates because
judges are not required to follow the risk assessment recommendation, which presume
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Texas provides a good example of the ability to reduce jail numbers
through release on recognizance (ROR).136 Between 1983 and 2018, the
Texas prison population increased by 329%.137 In the last ten years,
though, Texas courts began favoring ROR because of the inmate crisis.138
As a result, the prison population has decreased, allowing Texas to save
$2 billion by avoiding new prison construction costs and the closure of
three prisons.139 As the presumption shifts to release, judicial discretion
should be reduced as the ROR provides an “assurance to judges that cer-
tain defendants will not be held in pretrial detention.”140
To create a narrow detention net, detention should be an option only
for individuals who the government proves are statistically at high risk
due to prior violent crime and pose a substantial danger to specific indi-
viduals if released pretrial.141 Part of this consideration is limiting the
number of violent crimes or previous criminal acts that would increase
the likelihood of detention.142 Illinois sets a good example of what this
presumption may look like in its most recent bail reform act.143 The Illi-
nois Act requires that “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for re-
lease” unless the defendant has committed a forcible felony or other
violent crime and poses a physical threat to a person or persons.144 Al-
though the effects of the Illinois Act are not yet known, it limits its deten-
tion net in a way that will only impose detention on a limited number of
defendants.
Therefore, setting a precise goal would help ensure that bail reform
actually results in increased pretrial release.145 A 90% release rate for all
individuals arrested is a reasonable goal given empirical data on risk of
release). Some have also criticized pretrial release supervision services for the surveillance
costs they often impose on defendants.
136. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 44.
137. Incarceration Trends in Texas, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Dec. 2019), https://
www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-texas.pdf [https://
perma.cc/49MH-57SP].
138. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 44; Ryan Kellus Turner & Henry W. Knight, Making
It Personal in the Age of Bail Reform: The Misunderstanding, Utility, and Limits of Per-
sonal Bonds in Texas, 20 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 67, 68–69 (2019) (citing 2017 Texas sen-
ate discussions with appellate judges discussing the inmate crisis and whether the state
should increase the use of personal bonds).
139. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 7, at 14; see also Incarceration Trends in Texas,
supra note 137 (noting that jail population has increased 509% since 1970 but only 6%
since 2000).
140. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 43.
141. Id. at 92.
142. Baughman, supra note 1, at 1018 (For instance, New Jersey limits the number of
“violent crimes” subject to pretrial detention.). New Jersey has “proven influential across
the country on bail reform.” Russell M. Gold & Ronald F. Wright, The Political Patterns of
Bail Reform, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 743, 756 (2020). Essentially, “Advocates must
press for a narrow net involving only ‘extremely serious’ charges.” ULC Guide, supra note
44, at 5 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
143. See generally Public Act 101-0652, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2021).
144. Id. § 110-6.1(e).
145. Baughman, supra note 1, at 1014.
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release.146 Only fourteen states currently meet this standard when it
comes to misdemeanors, and many fewer would if felonies were taken
into account.147 When pretrial detention is necessary, the detention pe-
riod should be limited to twenty-four hours or forty-eight hours.148 In the
instances where release is not appropriate, prosecutors should consider
alternatives to detention,149 such as an unsecured bond,150 deposit bail,
conditional release,151 electronic monitoring,152 or diversion programs.
Pretrial detention should be the last resort.
CONCLUSION
As cities and states contemplate new legislation in the bail arena, our
hope is that they consider the seven recommendations shared in this in-
vited piece. The most important of these is that a narrow detention net
and a presumption of release from the police station should be the goal
for about 90% of defendants. We hope this piece will foster more discus-
146. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 187; Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 537
(“5% of defendants have more than a 5% chance of being rearrested on a violent felony
charge, with a few having higher than a 10% chance.”); Dais, supra note 91.
147. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 131, at 11–14 (noting that Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington had less than 10% pretrial detention rates
as of 2017). Please note that these percentages are 10% of the total population, not 10% of
defendants, which is a different consideration than what we are proposing here.
148. ULC Act, supra note 18, § 308(b).
149. No release option is superior to release on recognizance for a defendant. Substan-
tial monetary costs to a defendant can be incurred through “attendance requirements”
(which require the accused to return to court on a regular basis) or electric home monitor-
ing (which requires a “‘hook up’ fee” and regular internet service). Carroll, supra note 22,
at 187–88. Restrictions on a defendant’s physical liberty with conditional release can also
place a substantial burden on a defendant, potentially restricting their ability to find hous-
ing or work. Id. at 188–90.
150. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 43 (“An unsecured bond is where a defendant is
released after he contracts to appear before the court on a specified date and promises to
pay a set bail amount later if he fails to appear. The defendant pays nothing and puts no
deposit or property down in order to obtain release, and only pays the bond if he does not
appear in court.”).
151. Conditional release may be a “low-cost option for releasing individuals pretrial,
with tailored precautions to ensure the safety of the public.” Id. at 52 (noting that risk
assessment programs may guide the conditions, including “mandatory drug testing or sub-
stance abuse programs, counseling, or admittance to a rehabilitation facility,” that are ap-
plied in any particular situation). Judges must carefully consider certain costs to the
defendant associated with conditional release; otherwise, it can perpetuate detention. Car-
roll, supra note 22, at 184.
152. “Electronic monitoring may be an extremely effective low-cost pretrial alternative
as it allows officials to closely monitor defendants while allowing them freedom to work,
meet with attorneys, and remain with family.” See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 52–53; see
also Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring Drives Defendants into Debt,
PROPUBLICA (July 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/digital-jail-how-
electronic-monitoring-drives-defendants-into-debt [https://perma.cc/R84X-M97H] (“When
cities cover the cost of monitoring, they often pay private contractors $2 to $3 a day for the
same equipment and services for which EMASS charges defendants $10 a day.”). Moreo-
ver, as technology develops, the costs of electronic monitoring become lower. See Defend-
ants Driven into Debt by Fees for Ankle Monitors from Private Companies, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE (July 23, 2019), https://eji.org/news/defendants-driven-into-debt-by-fees-for-an-
kle-monitors [https://perma.cc/K5WZ-G64V].
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sion on how to dramatically increase pretrial release—from 60% release
nationally to 90%—rather than just focusing on the tools we use to evalu-
ate it. Tracking pretrial data on how to release defendants safely and
whether racial bias results from any pretrial interventions is important.
Detention pretrial should not be based on failure to appear. Removing
the influence of commercial money bail or determinations of release
based on wealth is also critical to bail reform. Criminal justice should not
be bound by corporate desires to increase arrest and detention, which
contradict our basic human rights of liberty and due process. The right to
counsel at the critical pretrial hearing should be respected by all states,
and if counsel is not provided, states should presumptively release all de-
fendants before trial. States should reject the federal detention model
that has proven to only increase detention due to a presumption of deten-
tion in the absence of proof otherwise. We fear the ULC Act, though a
step in the right direction in some ways, does not demand a narrow de-
tention net,153 improperly allows states broad discretion to create many
categories of permitted preventative detention, and could result in the
status quo or possibly increase pretrial detention. Most of the attempts to
reform bail in recent years have failed to reduce detention rates. In es-
sence, bail reform has failed defendants by failing to improve due process
and expand pretrial liberty. A simple way to judge a proposed bail bill is
to consider whether it presumes release or detention—incarceration or
liberty. If the default is release for the majority of people without any
action by government or defendant, then it looks more like pretrial re-
form. Reforming state bail reform requires a dramatically different ap-
proach than the one we have relied on so far in the third wave of reform.
The seven considerations of this piece provide a good first step towards
meaningful change.
153. The ULC draft does require an adopting state to articulate a detention net consis-
tent with its constitution and what offenses it deems “covered offenses.” ULC Act, supra
note 18, at §§ 308, 403; see also ULC Guide, supra note 44, at 12 (“However, depending on
how a state legislature elects to treat bracketed and other provisions, define its detention
net, or otherwise modify the Act, it could become a liability to those seeking to achieve
reform and reduce the use of pretrial jailing.”).
